McDonnell Douglas DC-10

Development

Background

Following an unsuccessful proposal for the United States Air Force's CX-HLS (Heavy Logistics System) in 1965, Douglas Aircraft began design studies based on its CX-HLS submission. The aviation author John H. Fielder notes that the company was under competitive pressure to produce a wide-body aircraft, having been somewhat slow in the previous decade to introduce its first jetliners. In 1966, American Airlines offered a specification to manufacturers for a twin-engine wide-body aircraft smaller than the Boeing 747 yet capable of flying similar long-range routes from airports with shorter runways; this specification would be highly influential in the design of what would become the DC-10. It would become McDonnell Douglas's first commercial airliner after the merger between McDonnell Aircraft Corporation and Douglas Aircraft Company in 1967.

An early DC-10 design proposal was for a four-engine double-deck wide-body jet airliner with a maximum seating capacity of 550 passengers and similar in length to a DC-8. The proposal was shelved in favor of a trijet single-deck wide-body airliner with a maximum seating capacity of 399 passengers, and similar in length to the DC-8 Super 60. The choice of three engines was influenced by surveys of potential customers other than American Airlines, together with a desire to enhance hot and high climb performance after an engine failure—a serious concern at Stapleton International Airport, which was heavily used by United Airlines, one of the major anticipated buyers. Large portions of the detailed design work, particularly that of the fuselage, were subcontracted to external companies, such as the American aerospace company Convair. The legal relationship between McDonnell Douglas, Convair, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) would later serve to complicate matters; specifically, Convair was forbidden from contacting the regulator no matter the severity of any safety concerns it had in the DC-10's design.

McDonnell Douglas management became seriously concerned about the viability of the DC-10 after learning about the competing Lockheed L-1011, which was very similar and was being offered to the same customers. On February 19, 1968, in what was supposed to be a knockout blow to Lockheed, George A. Spater, President of American Airlines, and James S. McDonnell of McDonnell Douglas announced American Airlines' intention to acquire the DC-10. This was a shock to Lockheed and there was general agreement within the US aviation industry that American Airlines had left its competitors at the starting gate. According to Fielder, McDonnell Douglas had been urgently pursuing the DC-10's completion in light of the prospective competition and the high financial stakes involved. Together with American Airlines' announcement of the DC-10 order, it was also reported that American Airlines had declared its intention to have the British Rolls-Royce RB211 turbofan engine on its DC-10 airliners. The DC-10 was first ordered by launch customers American Airlines with 25 orders, and United Airlines with 30 orders and 30 options in 1968. The DC-10's similarity to the Lockheed L-1011 in design, passenger capacity, and launch date resulted in a sales competition that affected the profitability of both aircraft.

Into flight

On August 29, 1970, the first DC-10, a series 10, conducted its maiden flight. An extensive flight test program was carried out, totaling 929 flights and 1,551 flight hours; the test program was not incident-free: during one ground test in 1970, an outwardly-opening cargo door blew out. The rapid de-pressurization of the cargo hold caused the main cabin's floor to collapse. This discovery and first effort at rectification led to a contract dispute between McDonnell Douglas and Convair over what changes were necessary and financial liability. Fielder alleges that McDonnell Douglas consistently sought to minimize and postpone any design changes to the DC-10, although this attitude was not an explicit policy. In July 1971, Convair outlined the situation in a formal memo; almost a year later, it internally expressed concerns that the inadequate resolution would lead to loss of aircraft. Tragically, the initial rectification work would prove to be inadequate.

On July 29, 1971, the FAA issued the type certificate for the DC-10, permitting its entry into revenue service. It entered commercial service with American Airlines on August 5, 1971, with the initial flight being a round-trip flight between Los Angeles and Chicago. United Airlines also commenced DC-10 flights later that same month. American's DC-10s were configured to seat a maximum of 206 passengers while United's seated 222; both had six-across seating in first-class and eight-across (four pairs) in coach.